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The Federalist Society for Law  
and Public Policy 
presents 
THE  FRAMERS’  UNDERSTANDING  OF  
ORIGINALISM AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 
2005  National  Lawyer’s  Convention 
November 11, 2005 
PANELISTS: 
Professor David M. Golove, New York University of Law 
Hon. Diarmuid F. O’Scannlain, United States Circuit Judge, United States 
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit 
Hon. William H. Taft IV, Fried Frank Harris Shriver & Jacobson, and 
Former Legal Advisor to the Secretary of State 
Professor John C. Yoo, University of California, Berkeley, Boalt Hall 
School of Law and Former Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Office of 
Legal Counsel, U.S. Department of Justice 
Hon. Ronald A. Cass, President, Cass & Associates, PC and Dean 
Emeritus, Boston University School of Law (moderator) 
 
MR. CASS: That’s  not  the  sign  to  stop  eating.    That’s  just  a  sign  that  
we’re  about   to  get   started  with   the  program.     There  are   some  seats  down  
front.    As  in  law  school,  you’re  probably  safest  sitting  up  front.    We  expect  
those sitting here to be prepared already,  so  we’ll  be  calling  on  those  of  you  
standing  in  the  back.    I’m  Ron  Cass.    I’m  chair  of  the  Federalist  Society  In-
ternational  Law  and  National  Security   practice   group,   so   I’m   responsible  
for  telling  you  what  alert   level  we’re  on   today.      I   think  after  Karl  Rove’s  
speech,  I  think  we’re  on  low  alert  level. 
Any time someone has what seems like a good idea, people are really 
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willing to line up behind it, although there are often questions about what 
is,   in   fact,   a   good   idea.     We’re   talking   this   morning   about the Framers’  
original understanding of international law, and there are a number of top-
ics that are wound together in this.  There is international law, the Law of 
Nations,  the  common  law  of  all  people,  and  there’s  also  foreign  law.    And  
at the beginning, we had attention to both.  There was particularly attention 
to maritime law under the heading of international law, and there was the 
incorporation of foreign law in our own law of what we did, because we 
inherited a great deal from Britain, but the Framers also studied the law of 
Rome and France and Scotland. 
We  have,  in  today’s  world,  a  renewed  sense  of  curiosity  about  the  role  
both sources of law should play.  We have international treaties that increa-
singly incorporate and rely on norms of international law, such as NAFTA, 
which in some provisions expressly invokes international law themes.  And 
we have some judges on federal courts invoking foreign law.  Famously, 
Justice Breyer invoked the law of one of the leading nations, Zimbabwe, in 
trying to figure out what we should be doing, what the right and moral 
thing to do was, in America under our Constitution.1  Both of these have 
become somewhat controversial, and our panel today is going to straighten 
out any and every question you have on sources of law, both foreign and 
domestic, and both ancient and modern. 
In order of appearance today, we have the Honorable Diarmuid 
O’Scannlain,  who  is  known  not  only  as  one  of  the  best  and  brightest  federal  
judges, but one of the least pronounceable federal judges.  Diarmuid is one 
of the judges on the Ninth Circuit, but we like him anyway.  He was a tax 
lawyer, the Deputy State Attorney General for Oregon, and a public utility 
commissioner, the director of the Oregon Department of Environmental 
Quality.  He was appointed by Ronald Reagan to the Ninth Circuit in 1986.  
He has sat on more than 6,000 cases and, as I understand from one of his 
clerks, written more than 9,000 opinions of those cases. 
Professor David Golove is a scholar on constitutional law and history.  
He has published well-known articles on the historical foundations of the 
treaty power, the relationship of international courts to constitutional 
process, and presidential authority over military and international affairs.  
He teaches constitutional law and international law at New York Universi-
ty.     He’s   the  Hiller  Family  Foundation  Professor  of  Law,  and  also  directs  
the JD/LL.M Program in international law at NYU. 
Professor John Yoo of Berkeley is also a leading scholar on the rela-
tionship of international law and war powers to constitutional commands.  
He’s  the  author  of  the  book,  The Powers of War and Peace: The Constitu-
tion and Foreign Affairs After 9/11,2 newly  published.    He’ll  be  autograph-
 
 1 See Knight v. Florida, 528 U.S. 990, 996 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
 2 See JOHN YOO, THE POWERS OF WAR AND PEACE: THE CONSTITUTION AND FOREIGN AFFAIRS 
AFTER 9/11 (Univ. of Chicago Press 2005). 
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ing  copies  after  the  session,  for  anyone  who’s  willing to buy one.  I under-
stand  that  this  is  not  the  typical  academic  book.    I’ve  written  a  number  of  
books,  and  they’re  academic  books;;  they’re  books  that,  once  you  put  them  
down,   you   just   can’t   pick   them   up   again.      But   John   assures  me   that   his  
book  isn’t one of them.  Actually, one of my books was bought by someone 
outside  the  family;;  we’re  still  trying  to  track  that  down.    In  addition  to  his  
scholarly title, John is former General Counsel to the Senate Judiciary 
Committee and the former Deputy Assistant Attorney General of the Office 
of  Legal  Counsel.    He’s  the  winner  of  the  Federalist  Society’s  Paul  M.  Ba-
tor Award for excellence in legal scholarship, a good friend, and an excel-
lent academic. 
Will Taft is counsel these days at Fried Frank Shriver Harris and Ja-
cobson.     He’s   the  former  General  Counsel  of  the  Department of Defense.  
He is the Former Deputy Secretary of Defense, the former Acting Secretary 
of Defense, former General Counsel of the Department of Health, Educa-
tion and Welfare.  He has a lot of former titles.  I was reading through 
them, and it took me 2 1/2 days to get through them.  Most recently, he was 
a Legal Adviser to the Department of State, someone who is an expert on 
the  topics  we’re  talking  about  today.    Will  says  he  has  promised  us  nothing 
about  what  he’ll  say,  and  he  expects  fully  to  deliver  on  that  promise. 
With  that,  let  me  turn  the  program  over  to  Judge  O’Scannlain. 
Diarmuid. 
 
JUDGE  O’SCANNLAIN: Thank you very much, Ron.  As the only 
judge on the panel, let me make the obligatory disclaimer up front that, 
while my perspective is certainly informed by my 19 years of service on 
the Ninth Circuit dealing with international and foreign law, including 
twice in the Sosa case,3 I speak of course only for myself and not for my 
court. 
The Founders rather clearly believed that the Law of Nations was a 
body of customary law regulating mutual intercourse among sovereign na-
tions.  Article 1, Section 8 of the Constitution gave Congress the power to 
“define and punish Piracies and Felonies committed on the high seas, and 
Offenses against the Law of Nations.”4  In 1789, the very first Congress 
passed the Alien Tort Claims Act, sometimes called the Alien Torts Statute, 
which permitted non-citizens to sue in federal court for torts committed 
against the Law of Nations, or a treaty to which the United States is a par-
ty.5  And yet, even though the Act incorporated the Law of Nations, neither 
the Framers nor the first Congress felt that the Law of Nations irrevocably 
 
 3 See Alvarez-Machain v. United States, 331 F.3d 604 (2003), vacated, Sosa v. Alvarez-
Machain, 543 U.S. 692 (2004). 
 4 U.S. CONST. art. I § 8, cl. 10. 
5 Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, §9(b), 1 Stat. 73, 76-77. 
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bound the United States.  Instead, they felt that the Law of Nations imposed 
constraints “in point of moral obligation.”6  In their view, the United States 
had the power to depart from aspects of the Law of Nations, provided that 
it was willing to face the international consequences.7 
With  that  said,  I’m  going  to  leave  to  my  colleagues  the  development  
of the Founders’  understanding  of  international  law.    My  task  is  to  focus  on  
another facet of the debate present at the founding: specifically, their gen-
eration’s   concern   about   the use of foreign legal sources by American 
judges.  By foreign legal sources or foreign law, I do not mean the Law of 
Nations.  American judges quite appropriately apply the Law of Nations 
when construing treaties and determining the content of customary interna-
tional law.  Instead, I will be dealing with the Founders’  views   regarding 
American  judges’  use  of  foreign  nations’ domestic law in interpreting the 
Constitution and laws of the United States. 
As you know, in several recent high-profile decisions, our Supreme 
Court has broken sharply with tradition by invoking foreign practice and 
precedent to support a controversial holding.  In Atkins v. Virginia,8 Justice 
Stevens referred to the fact that the execution of the mentally retarded is 
overwhelmingly condemned by the world community to bolster the conclu-
sion that such practice violates the Eighth Amendment of the United States 
Constitution.9 
Then, in Lawrence v. Texas,10 Justice  Kennedy  supported  the  Court’s  
holding that a statute making it illegal for persons of the same sex to en-
gage in certain sexual conduct violated the Due Process Clause, by observ-
ing that many other countries have accepted the right to sexual freedom, 
and by specifically citing to a decision of the European Court of Human 
Rights.11 
Most recently, in Roper v. Simmons,12 Justice  Kennedy’s  opinion  for  
the Court drew in part upon worldwide legal opinion, arguing that “the 
United States now stands alone in a world that has turned its face against 
 
6 Ware v. Hylton, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 199, 272 (1976) (Iredell, J.). 
7 Alvarez-Machain, 331 F.3d at 649 (O’Scannlain,  J.,  dissenting).  One of the handful of found-
ing-era cases involving the Alien Tort Claims Act recognized the power of the federal government to 
depart from the law of nations.  Bolchos v. Darrel, 3 F. Cas. 810, 811 (D.S.C. 1795) (No. 1,607) (“It  is  
certain that the law of nations would adjudge neutral property, thus circumstanced, to be restored to its 
neutral owner; but the . . . treaty with France alters that law . . . .”). 
8 536 U.S. 304 (2002). 
9 Id. at 317. 
10 539 U.S. 558 (2003). 
11 Id. at 573 (citing Dudgeon v. United Kingdom, 45 Eur. Ct. H.R. (1981) ¶ 52).  For further dis-
cussion of the use of comparative constitutional analysis in Lawrence, see Roger P. Alford, Federal 
Courts, International Tribunals, and the Continuum of Deference: A Postscript on Lawrence v. Texas, 
44 VA. J. INT’L L. 913,  915  (2004)  (“For  the  first  time  in  history,  a  majority  of  the  Supreme  Court  has  
relied on an international tribunal decision to interpret individual liberties embodied in the U.S. Consti-
tution.”).       
12 534 U.S. 551 (2005). 
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the juvenile death penalty.”13  He went on to defend the use of foreign 
precedent against his critics, writing that “[i]t does not lessen our fidelity to 
the Constitution or to our pride in its origins to acknowledge that the ex-
press affirmation of certain fundamental rights by other nations and peoples 
simply underscores the centrality of those same rights within our heritage 
of freedom.”14 
These recent examples of comparative constitutionalism in the Su-
preme  Court’s  jurisprudence  have  drawn  harsh  responses  from  adherents  to  
the traditional view that American courts should place exclusive reliance 
upon domestic sources of law.  In 2003, a resolution was introduced in the 
United States House of Representatives condemning the Atkins and Law-
rence decisions, and, as its title states, 
. . . expressing disapproval of the consideration by Justices of the Supreme Court 
of the United States of foreign laws and public opinion in their decisions, urging 
the end of this practice immediately to avoid setting a dangerous precedent, and 
urging all Justices to base their opinions solely on the merits under the Constitu-
tion of the United States.15 
And, seven United States Senators introduced a bill known as the 
Constitution Restoration Act, which provides that, “[i]n interpreting and 
applying the Constitution of the United States, a court of the United States 
may not rely upon any constitution, law, administrative rule, executive or-
der, directive, policy, judicial decision, or any other action of any foreign 
state or international organization or agency, other than English constitu-
tional law and common law.”16 
Now, I suggest that the introduction of these legislative measures re-
soundingly  echoes   the  founding  generation’s  belief  that  the  unique  social,  
economic, and political realities of American life require a distinctly Amer-
ican jurisprudence.  As you know, the earliest settlers in this country made 
a conscious decision to abandon certain aspects of English law.  In the 
words   of   one   scholar,   there  was   among   the   early   colonists   “a   very   clear  
perception of their destiny to work out a new legal system, to established 
rules dictated by their special polity, or by the conditions of primitive and 
simple life in which they found themselves.”17 
Many members of the founding generation were influenced by Mon-
tesquieu’s  theory, set forth in 1748 in the Spirit of the Laws, that the con-
tent  of  a  legal  system  ought  to  bear  a  close  relation  to  the  country’s  politi-
cal, social, economic, religious, and geophysical environment.  To quote 
Montesquieu,  “[Laws]  should  be  adapted  in  such a manner to the people for 
 
 13 Id. at 575 (“[T]he  United  States  is  the  only  country  in  the  world  that  continues  to  give  official 
sanction to the juvenile death penalty.”). 
 14 Id. at 575–77. 
 15 H.R. Res. 468, 108th Cong. at 1 (2003). 
 16 S. 2323, 108th Cong. (2004). 
 17 PAUL SAMUEL REINSCH, ENGLISH COMMON LAW IN THE EARLY AMERICAN COLONIES 57 
(Leonard W. Levy ed., Da Capo Press 1970) (1899). 
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whom they are made, as to render it very unlikely for those of one nation to 
be  proper   for  another.”18  Montesquieu’s  work  was  widely  circulated  and  
highly influential during the founding era, and the ideas formulated in the 
Spirit of the Laws helped speed the development of a legal system that was 
tailored to the realities of American life and shorn of foreign elements. 
Thomas Jefferson, for one, was a firm proponent of this movement.  
He read Montesquieu and shared his conception that the tenor of a legal 
system  must  coincide  with  the  nation’s  social  and  cultural  persuasion.     At  
the time of the American Revolution, Jefferson helped to introduce over 
100  bills  designed  to  bring  Virginia’s  laws  into  alignment  with  the  values  
of the American Revolution.  In the words of one such bill, these reforms 
were   necessary   because  many  of  Virginia’s   laws  were   “founded   on   prin-
ciples heterogeneous to the Republican spirit . . . [and], having taken their 
origin while our ancestors remained in Britain, are not so well adapted to 
our  present  circumstance  of  time  and  place.”19 
Notable reforms proposed by Jefferson included the abolition of prima 
genitor.     This  practice  of  awarding  an   intestate  parent’s  estate  exclusively  
to the eldest son was disfavored by Americans because it perpetuated an 
aristocratic class with vast land holdings.  Other reforms proposed by Jef-
ferson included the establishment of religious freedom and the institution 
of a system of humane criminal sanctions wherein capital punishment was 
to be reserved for murder and treason only. 
James Madison was instrumental in securing the enactment of many 
of  Jefferson’s  proposals.    Madison’s  sympathy  for  the  notion  that  our  fled-
gling republic needed to develop a legal system that was not unduly reliant 
upon foreign law is evidenced in the Federalist Papers.  In Number 42, 
Madison wrote that “neither the common, nor the statute law of [England], 
or of any other nation, ought to be a standard for the proceedings of this, 
unless previously made its own by legislative adoption.”20  Madison went 
on to assert that English law would be an illegitimate guide for the United 
States to follow.21 
A different approach to mitigating the influence of foreign law was 
adopted by the States of New Jersey, Kentucky, and Pennsylvania, which 
enacted statutes forbidding the citation of English precedent in their courts.  
New Hampshire had a court rule to similar effect.  The spirit of these early 
19th-century provisions was very similar to that of the Constitution Resto-
ration Act introduced last year, which would preclude federal courts from 
 
 18 BARON DE MONTESQUIEU, THE SPIRIT OF THE LAWS 6 (David Wallace Carriers ed., Univ. Cal. 
Press 1977 (1748). 
 19 THOMAS JEFFERSON, Bill for the Revision of the Laws (Oct. 15, 1776), reprinted in 1 THE 
PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 562, 562 (Julian P. Boyd ed., 1950). 
 20 THE FEDERALIST NO. 42, at 217 (James Madison) (George W. Carey & James McClellan eds., 
2001). 
 21 Id. 
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relying upon foreign law when interpreting the Constitution.22  As a result 
of these statutes, lawyers in the young republic found it necessary to seek 
guidance  from  the  country’s  own nascent collection of case law, rather than 
from the vast store of more readily available English decisions. 
I hope that this overview has succeeded in demonstrating that the 
Founders would not have approved of the citation of foreign practice and 
precedent happening in American courts today.  While the founding gener-
ation desired the United States to engage with the world community, and 
even explicitly incorporated aspects of the Law of Nations into American 
law, they believed that, on the domestic front, it was crucial to forge a uni-
quely American jurisprudence.  They accordingly felt that American jurists 
should place no reliance upon foreign legal authorities when interpreting 
the Constitution and laws of our own country. 
I’m  grateful  for  this opportunity to share perspectives with you, and I 
look forward to the question-and-answer session. 
Thank you. 
 
PROFESSOR GOLOVE: I want to thank you all for inviting me to 
address you today, and for the honor of being on this distinguished panel. 
The topic today is rather broadly formulated—the understanding of 
the Framers and the founding generation of international law—and   I’m  
going to make my remarks rather general in nature, in accordance with the 
topic at hand. 
So,  very  broadly,  I  think  it’s  uncontroversial to observe that the revo-
lutionary and founding generations both held the Law of Nations in very 
high regard, and it was very influential upon their thinking in general, and 
it served as an important source and guidance in many of the major politi-
cal actions that they took during the Revolutionary period, and then the 
founding. 
Now, speaking in particular about the revolutionary generation before 
I  get  to  the  founding,  it’s  uncontroversial  that  the  great  writers  of  the  Law  
of Nations, Vatel, Grotius, Pufendorf and others, many others, along with 
the great writers of the Natural Law tradition, Locke among them, were 
highly influential with the revolutionary generation and provided much of 
the inspiration for the Revolution itself.  They were part of the Enlighten-
ment rationalist tradition in which the American Revolution was born. 
Now, more specifically, the Law of Nations played a very vital role in 
 
 22 See generally Constitution Restoration Act of 2004, H.R. 3799, 108th Cong. § 201  (2004)  (“In  
interpreting and applying the Constitution of the United States, a court of the United States may not rely 
upon any constitution, law, administrative rule, Executive order, directive, policy, judicial decision, or 
any other action of any foreign state or international organization or agency, other than the constitution-
al  law  and  English  common  law.”). 
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shaping the development of the conflict between the colonists and Great 
Britain.  The colonists turned to the Law of Nations for developing ideas 
about an imperial constitution and imperial constitutional arrangements 
with the British Empire that might be acceptable to the colonists.  But when 
those ideas failed—that is, when the British refused to accept them—they 
then moved, after the Declaration of Independence, to adopt the Confedera-
tion.  Now, again, the Confederation itself was rooted in the teachings of 
the  great  writers  and  the  Law  of  Nations.    The  term  itself,  “confederation,”  
and the related terms,  “federation”  and  “federal,”  were  all  terms  that  were  
borrowed very self-consciously by the revolutionaries who created the Ar-
ticles of Confederation from the Law of Nations. 
During the critical period—the so-called critical period after the crea-
tion of the federation and before the founding—the Law of Nations played 
a very a vital role in U.S. policy.  The federal government or the Confede-
ration government was as assiduous as it could be in trying to strictly 
uphold, on behalf of the United States, the Law of Nations in the conduct 
of the Revolutionary War and in its relations with other powers, and they 
bitterly criticized the British for its unwillingness to recognize the Law of 
Nations applying to the revolutionary struggle. 
Now,  it’s  true  that  the weakness of the Confederation structure and the 
centrifugal forces that it unleashed made it extremely difficult for the Con-
federation officials—for the federal officials—to actually ensure that, at the 
state level, there would be compliance with the Law of Nations and with 
the treaties of the United States.  And, in fact, it was the failure of local of-
ficials to be able to carry out international obligations of the United States 
that was one of the principal impetuses to the Philadelphia Convention, 
and, ultimately, to the Constitution. 
It’s  worth  noting  that  the  opposition,  if  it  were  opposition  in  the  sense,  
to the Law of Nations, at least to complying with the treaties of the United 
States and the Law of Nations, was not a principled opposition to the Law 
of Nations.  It was rather a caving-in by localist politicians in the states to 
the intense pressure that they felt from popular pressure for taking reprisals 
against the loyalists in the wake of the revolutionary struggle.  So it was not 
principled—the arguments  that  were  brought  didn’t  actually  attack  the  Law  
of Nations—they were rather sophistical claims of interpretations of the 
Law of Nations, and led to nearly disastrous consequences for the nation. 
Now, let me turn to the founding generation.  The founding generation 
also held the Law of Nations in equally high regard.  The reverences for the 
Law of Nations that are expressed by the leading Founders repeatedly in 
their writings are legion.  Major figures in the American Revolution and 
founding who wrote about the Law of Nations, including Hamilton, Madi-
son, Wilson, Jay, Iridell, St. George Tucker, Marshall, and many others, 
wrote paeans to the Law of Nations, which were a commonplace through-
out the entire founding period.  There was almost a total absence of dissent-
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ing views on this question. 
I’m  going  to  touch  on  some  of  the  reflections  of  this  reverence  or  high  
regard that the Founders had for the Law of Nations in the founding period.  
Let me begin with the Declaration of Independence.  Even the Declaration 
of Independence—earlier, obviously, than the founding—Jefferson’s   fam-
ous invocation of the importance of appealing to or showing a decent re-
spect to the opinions of mankind is well known.  Less well known, but 
highly relevant—and especially  in  light  of  Judge  O’Scannlain’s  remarks—I 
think   it’s  worth  quoting  Madison.      In  view  of   the  general  debate that the 
judge was referring to the over use of foreign precedents and international 
precedents in U.S. courts, and over the so-called global test that was much 
discussed during the last presidential election, and in view of the current 
foreign policy crises we face, let me read from Madison in Federalist Num-
ber 63.  He says, 
An attention to the judgment of other nations, is important to every government, 
for two reasons: the one is, that, independently of the merits of any particular 
plan or measure, it is desirable, on various accounts, that it should appear to other 
nations as the offspring of a wise and honorable policy: the second is, that in 
doubtful cases, particularly where the national councils may be warped by some 
strong passion, or momentary interest, the presumed or known opinion of the im-
partial world, may be the best guide that can be followed.  What has not America 
lost by her want of character with foreign nations?  And how many errors and 
follies would she not have avoided, if the justice and propriety of her measures 
had, in every instance, been previously tried by the light in which they would 
probably appear to the unbiased part of mankind.23 
Another reflection of the Framers’  regard  for  the  Law  of  Nations ap-
pears as the pervasive view—really the unanimous view—that the Law of 
Nations was much like other law, like common law.  It was law in that 
sense.  It was binding on the United States.  It was obligatory for the United 
States to follow international law, and to a rather remarkable extent, that it 
was enforceable as law in the courts of the United States. 
Another point I want to make very briefly is that, during the Revolu-
tionary war, during the critical period—throughout the entire founding pe-
riod and much beyond—there was a very great importance attached by the 
founding generation to U.S. compliance with the Law of Nations.  And 
there was also an equal insistence on compliance by other countries and 
vindication of U.S. rights under the Law of Nations, particularly with re-
gard to the British.  In fact, this was a matter of principle, and it was the 
causas belli which led to the War of 1812. 
Now, let me turn to the role of the Law of Nations in respect to the 
Constitution itself.  The Law of Nations is pervasively related to the Amer-
ican Constitution.  Of course, there is again the idea of Federalism, which 
was borrowed from the Law of Nations.  In this respect, one of the great 
 
 23 THE FEDERALIST NO. 63 (James Madison), supra note 20, at 325. 
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geniuses of the founding generation of the Framers was their transforma-
tion of the idea of federalism into a new and unique form of government. 
The Law of Nations provided, much like the common law as to other 
parts of the Constitution, the background set of principles against which 
they would be necessary to understand what the Framers were doing, par-
ticularly with regard to foreign affairs powers.  What is the treaty power, 
for example?  Or, what is a treaty?  Well, the answer lies in the knowledge 
and understanding of what the Law of Nations provides, and this is a per-
vasive feature of all foreign affairs provisions. 
The Constitution also included many provisions which were designed 
to encourage and facilitate U.S. compliance with the Law of Nations, and 
it’s  probably  true  that  at  least  most  of  the  Founders, or the majority of the 
Founders, felt that, in extremis, Congress should have the power to violate 
the Law of Nations, but Congress only.  And they incorporated a number of 
mechanisms into the Constitution, the purpose of which was to ensure that 
compliance would be the rule. 
Now, let me just specify—I  have  very  little  time,  so  I’ll  just  specify—
the major mechanisms that they developed.  One is that they gave federal 
courts jurisdiction over all those kinds of cases they can imagine which 
would  raise  questions  of  the  Law  of  Nations.    It’s  not  that  they  didn’t  ex-
pect the state courts to apply the Law of Nations; on the contrary, they did 
expect the courts to apply the Law of Nations.  But they were concerned 
about the problem of uniformity in the interpretation of the Law of Nations 
and treaties.  And they also wanted to give Congress at least the option to 
make sure that it would be an exclusive federal matter; that is, the interpre-
tation of the Law of Nations. 
Of course, the Founders made it difficult to enter into treaties; but, 
once treaties were entered into, they adopted an innovative—and at the 
time,  unique—provision which made the treaty, upon ratification ipso fac-
to at least in most cases, the supreme law of the land under the Supremacy 
Clause.  Now, this, from the very beginning of our history, gave rise to the 
self-executing treaty doctrine, that treaties—at least in many contexts—can 
be enforced by courts directly as law, and also to the idea that treaties are 
binding on the executive branch, given its duty faithfully to execute the 
law. 
Finally—and this is the point that I want to emphasize today—the 
Framers provided that the President would be bound in exercising his for-
eign affairs powers, his constitutional foreign affairs powers, to observe the 
Law of Nations.  And in particular, when the President was acting and 
commander-in-chief, he would be bound to observe the international laws 
of war. 
Now, maybe I can state that a little differently and a little more affir-
matively.  The Framers understood the commander-in-chief power itself to 
be power subject to other separation of powers constraints and the Bill of 
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Rights, but the power to exercise the belligerent rights of the United States 
under the laws of war.  This was an extremely broad grant of authority to 
the President, but it was not an unlimited grant of authority.  One limitation 
was precisely rooted in the very conception of the power itself, which was 
the power that the President could exercise the belligerent rights of the 
United  States,  but  he  couldn’t  go  beyond  the  belligerent  rights  of  the  Unit-
ed  States.     He  couldn’t  violate what they would have called, and did call, 
the rules of civilized warfare. 
Now, let me read to you from Madison—this is pervasive understand-
ing of the time of the founding—from one of his famous Helvidius letters 
in  1793.    Madison  says,  “[T]he  executive  is  bound  faithfully  to  execute  the  
laws   of   neutrality,”—that’s part of the laws of war—“whilst   those   laws  
continue unaltered by the competent authority . . . .”24  That is, by Con-
gress.    “It  is  bound  to  the  faithful  execution  of  these  as  of  all  other  laws  in-
ternal and external,” that is, internal, meaning municipal law or congres-
sional statutes; and external, meaning the Law of Nations.25  “It  is  bound  to  
the faithful execution of these, as of all other laws internal and external, by 
the nature of its trust and the sanction of its oath . . . .”26 
But  it  wasn’t  only  Madison.  It was Hamilton and his Pacificas letters.  
It was many, many other leading members of the founding generation who 
expressed his view on a variety of occasions.  It was, in fact, taken from the 
British constitutional practice.  It was in the mid-18th century, when Lord 
Mansfield, patently most famously, in a very famous memorial he wrote on 
the Silesian loans to the Prussian king, where he established and elaborated 
the principle that the king could not order violations of the laws of war—
the crown had no such power—and that the British courts would not give 
effect to orders which violated the Law of Nations.  It was an article of 
faith among the founding generation, a basic Republican limitation on the 
scope of executive power. It appears in Marshall Court decisions repeated-
ly, and it appears in opinions offered by executive branch officials during 
the early Republic, as well as members of Congress in debates over the qu-
asi war with France in the 1790s, and then again in the lead-up to the War 
of 1812. 
I’m  going  to  close  there  with  the  following  observation.    There’s  a  real  
dilemma for those who hold too strongly to two views, and I assume that 
there may be people who fit that description that are members of this Socie-
ty.  On the one hand is a deep skepticism about international law, perhaps 
even hostility to international law; and, on the other hand, a deep respect 
for the founding, and for original meanings and original intentions.  This is 
a real dilemma, and, I would urge you, when you hear the siren call of 
 
 24 JAMES MADISON, “Helvidius” Number 2, reprinted in 15 THE PAPERS OF JAMES MADISON 80, 
86 (Thomas A. Mason et al., eds., 1985). 
 25 Id. 
 26 Id. 
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people  who  want  to  tell  you  that  it  ain’t  so,  that  you  listen  to  the  siren  calls  
with a degree of skepticism and give those claims a degree of scrutiny that 
is  sufficient  to  really  convince  yourself  honestly  that  the  views  they’re  ex-
pressing reflect the understanding of the Founders. 
Thank you very much. 
 
PROFESSOR YOO: I’d  like  to  thank  the  Federalist  Society  for  once  
again—as it does on an annual basis—saving me from the jurisdiction of 
the  People’s  Republic  of  Berkeley  and  allowing  me   to come to a slightly 
more conservative place, the city of Washington, D.C.  Also—no offense, 
Judge—I’m  also  very  happy  to  be  outside  the  jurisdiction  of  the  Ninth  Cir-
cuit for a few days.  Although, as you all know, Congress is studying the 
proposition of splitting the Ninth Circuit, and I think the real answer is that 
we should split the state of California and have a section in the center 
called Schwarzeneggerland, where people can move if they want to escape 
the city of Berkeley, or at least Los Angeles, rather than splitting the Ninth 
Circuit. 
I also would like to thank Ron.  I am trying to plug this book; The 
Powers of War and Peace is the title.27  I  don’t  think  I’m  signing  any  cop-
ies.  This is actually a draft.  It seems to be the habit that drafts of mine get 
out before the final versions.  But I think the final version is now out and I 
encourage  you  to  purchase  it.     Buy  it  on  Amazon  and  if  you  don’t  like  it,  
you  can  return  it.    It  doesn’t  hurt  the  sales  figures. 
Let me make a few comments about international law; and I think Da-
vid and I see things, probably not surprisingly, very differently, although I 
do welcome him into the camp of originalists.    I  think  it’s  a  very  odd  thing,  
actually, if you look at international law as a field.  Most people who might 
think of themselves as liberal academics usually worship at the altar of 
Madison and Hamilton  and  the  framing,  and  I  think  it’s  great  that  we  have  
chosen to fight on common ground. 
Many things David said I think fairly represent the majority view in 
the academy today, those views being that international law is federal law 
and is binding on the United States through the Supremacy Clause; the idea 
that the President, in particular, cannot violate international law—there are 
some people who go farther and say that the President cannot terminate 
treaties on his own authority, that he needs congressional permission.  All 
of these positions, like many things in the academy, have the virtue of be-
ing utterly inconsistent with practice and the beliefs of numerous Presidents 
and Congress over the years.  Just the treaty termination question—more 
than   half   the   treaties  we’ve   ever   terminated   have   been   terminated   by   the  
President  alone.    As  you  know,  we’re  fighting  in  the  federal  courts  now  the  
 
 27 See YOO, supra note 2. 
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idea of whether customary international law itself can be binding on the 
United States and actually become federal law. 
I want to address a few of those issues mostly through the lens of trea-
ty termination, and, in particular, the neutrality proclamation.  But, before I 
do that,  I  think  it’s  fair  to  admit  that  international law was important during 
the drafting of the Constitution.  Certainly there are phrases in the Constitu-
tion, like the power to declare war and the power to define violations of the 
Law of Nations, which explicitly refer to international law.  It is also true 
that the Framers were very worried about states violating international law.  
That  had  led   to  the  disputes  with  Great  Britain  at   the   time.     And  it’s   true  
that the United States had often made appeals to international law in its dip-
lomatic relations, which is not surprising because, if you think about it, in 
the late 18th century, the United States was a militarily weak country, and 
it was commonly using international law to try to convince the British not 
to do yet another bad thing to the United States. 
On  the  other  hand,  it’s  useful  to  think  of  what  the  Constitution actually 
did—let’s  start  with  the  text  and  structure.     What  did  the  Constitution  ac-
tually  do   to  prevent   these  problems?      It  doesn’t  actually say anywhere in 
the document that international law is part of federal law.  The Supremacy 
Clause   doesn’t  mention   international   law   as   one   of   the   binding   forms   of  
supreme federal law.  What the Constitution did, I think, quite simply, is it 
centralized control over international law and foreign affairs in the national 
government and left it up to the national government to decide whether to 
violate international law or not.  So, a lot of quotes you read from the fram-
ing about how great international law  is  and  how  it   shouldn’t  be  violated  
are usually the Framers criticizing the states in their practices, which led to 
the crisis with Great Britain. 
The other thing is, think about how the Supremacy Clause and federal 
lawmaking work.  If you look at the Supremacy Clause, if you look at how 
laws are made in this country, they all involve some kind of process that 
goes through the House or the Senate, and the President, or both or various 
accommodations of such.  Why would it be that the Framers would have 
created a way for a body of law to be directly incorporated into American 
law without any review, or being passed on in any way by the political 
branches of government, unlike statutes, treaties, and constitutional 
amendments?  All those forms of law either involve the President, or the 
Senate, or both—actually they do involve the President and the Senate.  
Why would it have been that international law would have been exempted 
somehow from this process for making all other forms of federal law? 
The one thing to turn to would be treaties, because I think it would be 
the case that, if we could agree that presidents can violate treaties or termi-
nate treaties on their own authority, which seemed to be a much harder 
form of international law, then, certainly, I think it would logically be the 
case that the President would have those same powers with regard to inter-
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national law, customary international law, which are never actually ex-
pressed in any kind of written document. 
Take a look at the treaty power.  The first major treaty controversy 
that arose in our country was over the neutrality of the United States in the 
Napoleonic wars.  In 1778, the United States signed a treaty of alliance 
with France, which committed us to defending French territory in the Ca-
ribbean, and actually committed the United States to letting the French use 
the United States as a territory or a base to conduct naval operations against 
anybody that it was at war with.  1793 was the beginning of the war be-
tween France and Great Britain.  France declared war on Great Britain and 
Holland, and the United States government was thrown into turmoil be-
cause  we  weren’t  sure  whether  our  mutual  defense  obligations  with  France  
required us, or would require us, to enter into the war against Great Brit-
ain—something nobody in the government wanted to do. 
On that occasion, President Washington held a Cabinet meeting.  This 
was actually a day when they had Cabinet meetings that actually decided 
things, sort of like an appellate court—except for the Ninth Circuit, of 
course.  They sat in a room together and talked about the neutrality procla-
mation, and we have the documents of what Washington asked them and 
what  people’s  responses  were.    And  the  interesting  thing  is  that  nobody in 
that room, for one, ever thought that the President had to consult with Con-
gress in deciding what policy to pursue in violating, suspending, terminat-
ing, or acting inconsistently with the treaty with France.  This was quite in-
teresting,  because  this  was  a  treaty  that  wasn’t even made by a president; it 
was made in 1778 before the Constitution. 
If there was a belief at the time that the President needed cooperation 
of the other branch of government to violate international law, you 
would’ve   thought   that   he  would   have  wanted   to consult Congress on the 
interpretation of the French treaties.  Instead, everybody in the Cabinet—
and this included Jefferson and Hamilton—seemed to agree that this was a 
presidential decision; this was not some kind of joint presidential-
Congressional decision. 
The other thing they argued about was international law.  Hamilton 
argued immediately for a suspension or termination of the treaties because 
the regime in France had changed, and, he argued, we had made the treaty 
with the king of France, and now there’s   this   rabble  or  mob   in  charge  of  
France;;  we   don’t   have   a   treaty  with   them,   so  we’re   out   of   it.     We   don’t  
need to obey this treaty.  Jefferson made an argument based primarily on 
international law that said that we are not allowed to break treaties just be-
cause   there’s  been  a   change   in  government.     At   the   same   time,  however,  
Jefferson never argued, Hamilton never claimed he argued, and Washing-
ton never thought it was an argument, that, if he decided to terminate the 
treaties, that, even if it were illegal under international law—if Jefferson 
was right that this somehow would prevent the President from reaching that 
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decision and acting upon it under our constitutional system—if you go back 
and  look  at  the  records,  I  think  it’s  quite  clear  everyone  assumed that Presi-
dent Washington could have terminated our treaties with France if he had 
wanted to.  Instead, what he did was he issued a neutrality proclamation, 
which said that the United States would remain neutral in the conflict, and 
no U.S. territory could be used to help in attacking either the French or the 
British, which itself was quite inconsistent with the text of the Treaty of Al-
liance with France. 
The passage that David quoted from Helvidius comes from James 
Madison.  He was quite critical of the neutrality proclamation.    I  think  it’s  
the judgment of most historians that the Helvidius argument was quite un-
successful.    Madison  himself  didn’t  really  want  to  make  it.    It’s  very  inter-
esting Jefferson was so irritated because, he said, Hamilton was out there 
writing too much in the newspapers—he has his famous quote.  He says 
Hamilton  is  such  a  busy  body;;  he’s  like  a  host  of  people  all  by  himself.    So  
he  wrote  a  letter  to  Madison  and  he  said,  well,  I’m  not  going  to  write  this,  
but, Madison, you, please write  some  papers  responding  to  Hamilton’s  de-
fense in the neutrality proclamation.  You have a clear idea of who was the 
judge and who was the clerk here. 
So, Madison went out and he wrote these Helvidius papers.  His basic 
argument was that the neutrality proclamation was illegal and unconstitu-
tional because, by declaring peace, President Washington had deprived 
Congress the ability to declare war, which I think many people today agree 
is a complete non sequitur.  Congress could have declared war, if it wanted 
to, regardless of the neutrality proclamation.  And I think, because of that, 
historically people have thought the Helvidius arguments and papers are 
quite unconvincing. 
The  other  thing  I  will  note  is  that  I  don’t  think  Madison  was  quite  con-
sistent himself during his career.  In the Virginia ratifying convention, 
which is the convention where the commander-in-chief powers were exten-
sively debated, Patrick Henry—those of you who have ever looked at this, 
remember, Patrick Henry was the fellow who said “give  me  liberty  or  give  
me   death,”   and   then   a   lot   of   people   tried   to   give   him   the   latter—Patrick 
Henry claimed, making exactly the claim that people make today, that the 
commander-in-chief power was so large and great it would lead to a Dem-
ocratic tyranny by the President as the head of the military. 
Madison, of course, said that you should have faith in Congress; Con-
gress will have the funding power to cut off any misadventures by the Pres-
ident.  But there was no claim in the Virginia convention, where the Consti-
tution only passed 188 to 180—just a four-vote difference—that it was 
going to be international law that was going to bind the commander-in-
chief. 
So, putting the framing aside, just let me end by asking whether it 
would make sense as a matter of policy today for us to read the Constitu-
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tion to bind the President or bind the United States through international 
law.  Why would it make sense for us to adopt this reading of the federal 
lawmaking system that would bring in this body of law without having to 
go through the process of statutes or treaties, rather than what I think the 
Framers thought,  which  would’ve  been  sort  of  a  political  process  check  un-
der international law? 
So just ask yourself the questions about the use of force.  You know, 
under international law today—conventional international law—it’s   a   vi-
olation of international law for a country to use force, except in its self-
defense  or  when  it’s  authorized  by  the  Security  Council.     And  I  think  it’s  
worthwhile  to  ask  whether  that’s  actually yielded good results for the Unit-
ed States or the international system.  So, two cases in point.  First, a case 
where  the  UN’s  power  was  upheld  was  in  the  case  of  Rwanda,  where  the  
United States and other countries did not receive Security Council resolu-
tions to go to Rwanda, and the lesser nations never sent any real troops to 
try to stop what was happening in Rwanda, and you saw a genocide of al-
most a million people there. 
Also ask yourself the question about Kosovo, where the United States 
and its allies invaded, attacked another sovereign nation, Serbia, without 
UN Security Council permission.  I think many people honestly would 
have to admit that our intervention in Kosovo was illegal under internation-
al law.  But was that not, in fact, better for the United States and its allies, 
and, if you want to call it, global welfare that the United States did not feel 
itself bound by the UN Security Council in that case. 
So,  it’s  always  fine  and  great,  obviously,   if   the  United  States  can  act  
consistent with international law; but the question is whether the United 
States should be bound in all cases to have to obey international law, even 
when it would be better for our country, or for the international system, for 
the United States to act contrary to it.  I think our Framers, in their wisdom, 
left that question up to the President, primarily, or the President and Con-
gress  acting   together;;  but  they  certainly  didn’t   try   to  answer that question 
through the Supremacy Clause or trying to bind our nation into internation-
al law without the check of the political process. 
Thanks. 
 
HON. MR. TAFT: Well, let me say I am very grateful to the Federal-
ist  Society  for  the  invitation  to  be  with  you  today.    I’ve  heard  that  some  of  
your invitees recently have been eager to put some distance between them-
selves and the Society.  Not me.  For a person who has been just a normal 
conservative Republican for 60 years—which is to say, since before my 
mother came out of the ether—an invitation to be on a panel here is ob-
viously pure   gold.      Harriet  Miers   should’ve   been   so   lucky.      And,   in  my  
case,   I’m  very   grateful,   and   I  will   be   sure   to  put   it   on  my   résumé,   that   I  
have been with you now not just once, but twice, in any case, should a sen-
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ator  should  make  an  inquiry  about  this.    It’s  a great pleasure for me to be 
here, not only for that career move purpose, but also to be enlightened by 
my fellow panelists on a subject in which I have to say they have the ad-
vantage of me in terms of scholarship and expertise. 
Just very briefly, then, since   we’ve   taken   a   lot   of   time   and   they’ve  
covered  a  lot  of  ground,  I’ll  give  you  my  few  points  that  have  occurred  to  
me as I have looked over the subject that was assigned to us in this panel.  
My  impression  is,  essentially,  and  I  think  it’s  agreed  here,  that the Framers 
were very committed to compliance with international law, at least at the 
state-to-state level, the obligations taken by nations. 
One of the objectives of the Declaration of Independence was to take 
advantage of the status of a state on the international plane; particularly the 
right—and   it’s   in   the   last   part   of   it—the right to contract alliances.  But, 
there was a real focus on what states were, by right, entitled to do; and the 
Framers well understood that obtaining these rights also entailed assuming 
some responsibilities and duties; and I think there is every reason to believe 
and to know that they were very much committed to establishing the Unit-
ed States as a nation.  A part of that was to take its place in the international 
scheme—to have those rights, and to insist on them—but also to insist on 
the duties of other states to respect their rights, and to undertake to respect 
those rights and those duties themselves. 
This appears, as I say, in the Declaration of Independence.      It’s  also  
very   evident,   it’s   in   John   Jay’s   famous   grand   jury   charge   in   Richmond,  
where  he  talked  of  the  Law  of  Nations,  “by  which  nations  are  bound  to  re-
gulate”—bound, he says—“to  regulate  their  conduct  towards  each  other.”28 
And   it’s  also   there   in   the  early court cases.  You see it in The Charming 
Betsy,29 which circumscribes the role of other laws to make them conform 
where possible, unless absolutely directly contrary, to international law and 
customary law and the Law of Nations.  You see it in Guyot v. Hilton30 and 
a  number  of  other  cases.    It’s  well-established,  and  I  don’t  think  there’s  any  
disagreement on the panel about that. 
The more difficult question has always been how far the Law of Na-
tions has been imported into domestic law, and what the Framers’  concep-
tion about that was.  And, to the extent that it may have been imported into 
domestic law, how did that happen?  My sense of where the Framers 
were—and I hesitate to put it this way—but, in some respects, it seems the 
Framers got it wrong as to what the Constitution meant, or has come to 
mean; certainly, because my impression is that most of the Framers felt that 
international law, the Law of Nations, had come in more effectively into 
domestic law than in fact has been the case, or, in fact, I would say, has 
been desirable. 
 
 28 Jay,  charge  to  Grand  Jury,  Henfield’s  Case,  11  Fed.  Case  No.  6360. 
 29 Murray v. The Schooner Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. 64, 118 (1804). 
 30 Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113 (1895). 
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They got this idea, I think, from Blackstone—who, in the middle of 
the 18th century, was the authority with whom they were all familiar—who 
said that the Law of Nations was part of the law of the land of Great Brit-
ain.    There’s  no  ambiguity  there.    You  find  it  also  in  the  Attorney  General’s  
opinions—Attorney General Randolph; Attorney General Lee—both said 
very simply that the Law of Nations was the law of the land.  And, in fact, I 
think Attorney General Randolph—and,   this   would’ve   been   in   1792   or  
1793—said   that   it  was   the   law  of   the   land;;   even   though  “not   specifically  
adopted by the Constitution or any municipal  act”;;31 so, he was importing 
it.  At least, that was what he thought, perhaps not thinking deeply—
obviously not with the advantage of all of the scholarship that we now 
have—but  it’s  there.    This  was  certainly  his  impression. 
I  think  Washington’s  neutrality  proclamation,  and  Hamilton’s  defense  
of it to which John Yoo has referred, also relied to a degree and an aspect 
to which he did refer, on importing customary international law into do-
mestic law in a rather dramatic fashion, where Washington actually at-
tempted to bring in the law and make violations of the Law of Nations 
criminal just by saying  so   in  his  proclamation.      It’s  clear  now  that   this   is  
not possible.    That’s  been  established,  and  I  think  rightly  so. 
Madison, as John said, was stimulated by Jefferson to respond to 
Hamilton’s  defense  of  the  proclamation.    And,  in  this  aspect,  I  think  Madi-
son   was   correct,   and   he’s   been   borne   out   later:   namely,   that,   in   making  
something a criminal act by the statement that something was a violation of 
the Law of Nations, that in fact you do need an enactment of legislation by 
Congress; and Madison did make that point.  I think it was a good point, 
and it has stood up.  He said that basically that the Congress had to act un-
der Article 1, its authority to define the offense against the Law of Nations; 
and, of course Congress did do so, I think just a year later.    So,  it  wasn’t  a  
disagreement of policy, but it was a disagreement as to what was necessary 
and how you would bring the Law of Nations properly into domestic law. 
So, in any case, it seems to me fair to say—and this is clear—that the 
Framers were not really of one mind on the extent to which the Law of Na-
tions would become the law of the land.  There was some idea that it cer-
tainly had become so, or could be made so, but there was no agreement on 
either that point or, if it did, where it did.  Was it going to be a part of fed-
eral common law?  Was it going to be just a rule of decision for courts?  
Was it going to be part of state common law?  Or, none of these—would 
you actually need the legislation, which Article 1 authorizes Congress to 
take?  I   don’t   think,   as   I   say,   that   there  was   complete   agreement   on   that  
point; and that, of course, enables us to continue to discuss it as we do, and 
to seek for more enlightenment. 
Thank you. 
 
 31 1  Op.  Att’y  Gen.  26,  27  (1792)  (Randolph). 
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DEAN CASS: Well, now that we have dealt with importing interna-
tional and foreign law into U.S. law, we can deal with exporting some of 
the control over the panel to the audience.  Now we are open for your ques-
tions.    I  know  this  is  a  very  shy  group,  so  we’ll  let  you  volunteer  before  we  
began calling on members of the audience. 
Let me encourage people to line up behind the microphones.  Let me 
ask you to get in line there. 
We’ll  start  with  the  first  gentleman  at  the  microphone. 
 
AUDIENCE PARTICIPANT: My name is Ben Davis.  I teach at the 
University of Toledo Law School.  My question is along these lines.  First, 
going back to originalism: I have great ambivalence about originalism, 
simply because I have an ancestor from 1787, who was born in Africa and 
who was enslaved in 1800, and two of the people who owned her and her 
family were presidents of the United States; so, I go way back with an issue 
on the ideas of the people at the time. 
But, with regard to the discussions that you have here, my question is, 
isn’t   it   just   a   dance   between  de jure and de facto here, where you could 
have  Mr.  Golove’s  point  of  view  of  de jure and there would be an obliga-
tion, but that de facto when the President of the United States, under the 
commander-in-chief powers, otherwise violates some kind of international 
law obligation, there is no sanction against him in our system; so you can 
reconcile both Mr. Golove that Mr. Yoo by that. 
Now, if there were enforcement mechanisms that would constrain the 
President of the United States or the people who work for him—for exam-
ple, for conspiracy to commit torture—in courts of the United States, that 
might resolve the issue in terms of the limits there would be on the Presi-
dent.  But, barring enforcement mechanisms either at the state or federal 
level,   aren’t   we   just   left   with   a   de jure obligation, but a de facto non-
application with non-enforcement, which would reconcile both? 
 
DEAN CASS: Let’s  see  if  the  panelists  can  reconcile  their  views  with  
that question. 
 
PROFESSOR GOLOVE: Yes,   I   think   it’s   a   good   point.      I   don’t  
think our views can be reconciled, even through that method.  I think 
they’re  irreconcilable.    I  think  John  and  I  are,  in  some  sense,  inhabiting  dif-
ferent  worlds,  and  to  a  very  disturbing  degree  to  me.    But  I’m  going  to  put  
that aside for the moment. 
Yes, this is a de jure world  I’m  describing.  But, mind you, this is a 
feature  of  public  law  in  general.    That  is,  it’s  not  unique  to  the  Law  of  Na-
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tions that, when a governmental official in a capacity to take action may, in 
fact, violate the Law of Nations and there is no reliable procedure to correct 
the violation to vindicate the rights that have been violated, that is a feature 
of  the  Law  of  Nations.    It’s  also  a  feature  of  all  constitutional  law. 
Courts are sometimes available.  The question is why it is the courts 
are complied with.  After all,  courts  don’t  have  an  army  to  use  against  the  
political branches.  The public law in general has this feature, and it means 
that, sometimes, for example, presidents violate constitutional law and 
nothing is done about it because they have impunity in a sense; because 
there’s   not   a   political   process   which   would   necessarily   vindicate   their  
rights.     That  doesn’t   change   the  de jure status of the constitutional rights 
that are in issue, any more than it changes the constitutional obligations of 
the President to comply with the Law of Nations. 
 
JUDGE  O’SCANNLAIN: I would just like to add that I think there is 
at least one situation in which international law or the Law of Nations is 
part of American law, and that is in the Alien Torts Statute; because we 
have to determine whether an alien who invokes that statute has rights 
which  arise  out  of  the  violation  of  the  Law  of  Nations,  and  that’s  what  was  
going on in the Alverez-Machain v. Sosa32 case; and, to that extent, it would 
seem to be that it would have to be a recognition that international law is 
American law to that extent.  And, a great deal of what we were doing in 
those cases was trying to identify, based on everything from Pufendorf and 
Grotius and others, what is the norm to which the United States is commit-
ted. 
 
DEAN CASS: John, do you want one more crack at this before we 
take the next question? 
 
PROFESSOR YOO: You know, I agree with David that we inhabit 
different  worlds.    It’s  probably  safer  for  both  of  us.    But  let  me  just  ask—in 
response to your question, I think what you just suggested—Congress pass-
ing a criminal statute is perfectly appropriate.  I mean, Congress can also 
incorporate norms of international law into domestic law both through the 
Alien Torts Statute or Criminal Acts, and it has the power.  Article 1, Sec-
tion 8 says that Congress has the power to define and punish violations of 
the Law of Nations.  It also seems to imply that, if Congress  doesn’t  do  it,  
why should that actually exist, then, as a legal prohibition as directly to 
federal law without congressional action? 
Let me give you examples, then, of whether we really want to test the 
idea that de jure or de facto international law should constrain the Presi-
 
 32 Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 712 (2004). 
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dent.  Many people in international law believe that the use of nuclear wea-
pons against cities is a violation—a massive violation—of human rights.  
Almost half of the Court of International Justice issued an opinion suggest-
ing that.  Would that mean that the President was constitutionally prohi-
bited from considering the use of nuclear weapons without any congres-
sional action? 
Again, take the example of Kosovo.  Kosovo was illegal under inter-
national law.  Does that mean that, under our Constitution, it was illegal for 
the President to order the use of force in Kosovo?  Put aside the fact that 
the war was also a violation of the War Powers Resolution.33  But is that—
without congressional action one way or another—is it unconstitutional for 
the President to launch our forces into Kosovo? 
 
DEAN CASS: Let me take the next question. 
 
AUDIENCE PARTICIPANT: Judge   O’Scannlain,   forgive   me   if   I  
don’t  have  this  exactly  right.    The  Restoration  of  Constitution Act that you 
referred to—where  is  the  authority  of  Congress  to  do  that?    I’m  asking  be-
cause  I  don’t  know.    And  assuming  they  have  the  authority, is it truly bind-
ing on the Supreme Court and the other courts?  And even if it is binding, 
are they likely to just ignore it anyway? 
 
JUDGE  O’SCANNLAIN: Well,  first  of  all,  it’s  not  an  act;;  it’s  a  bill  
that was introduced.  That would be the name of the act, if in fact it would 
pass.    I  am  not  aware  of  any  significant  probability  that  it’s  going  to  get  an-
ywhere, other than the fact that it was introduced.  And I think, if anything, 
it’s   an   expression   of   anxiety   expressed   in   that   form.      That   is   to   say that 
there are very obvious, as you suggest, separation of powers issues that 
would have to be resolved, if, in fact, it would ever be passed.  My refer-
ence to it is only to suggest how topical all of this is and how concerned a 
very wide variety of Americans feel about this whole issue. 
 
AUDIENCE PARTICIPANT: My  question  is  kind  of  specific.     It’s  
to  the  whole  panel,  but  I  was  curious  about  what  the  panel’s  opinion  is  on  
international efforts to affect individual liberties—specifically, the effects 
to try to change internationally—gun control efforts is specifically what 
I’m   looking   at—and efforts to possibly affect the Second Amendment 
within  the  country,  and  what  the  panel’s  opinion  is  on  how  that’s  going  to  
be affected. 
 
 
 33 50 U.S.C. §§ 1541 et seq. (2006). 
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DEAN CASS: Do you have a weapon at the moment? 
 
AUDIENCE PARTICIPANT: No, sir.  Not right now.  Not in D.C. 
 
DEAN CASS: Then you can answer as you want. 
(No response.) 
 
DEAN CASS: No takers, huh?  Obviously everyone agrees with the 
question. 
 
HON. MR. TAFT: I   think   that’s   right.     There is no basis on which 
foreign countries or peoples can enact statutes for the United States or 
amend  our  Constitution,  as  you’ve  suggested.    It  can’t  happen. 
 
PROFESSOR GOLOVE: I   think   it’s   uncontroversial   that   a   treaty  
that is in violation of the Constitution—say, one of the provisions of the 
Bill of Rights—is  an  unconstitutional  treaty  and  wouldn’t  be  given  effect  in  
the United States. 
 
DEAN CASS: Hopefully,  you’ll  rest  easy  now. 
 
AUDIENCE PARTICIPANT: My   name   is   Briard.      I’m   a   French  
Supreme Court attorney.  I want to thank you, Judge, for quoting my com-
patriot, Charles Louis de Secondat, Baron de Montesquieu—this was the 
name, the complete name.  The guy had a long name.  And I want to thank 
also Professor Yoo for mentioning the 1778 treaty, which reminds us that 
our country was the very first in the world to recognize your independence. 
 
DEAN CASS: We’ll  now  entertain  a  motion  to  overturn  the  Neutrali-
ty Act. 
 
AUDIENCE PARTICIPANT: On the issue we talk about, I would 
like to say three things.  The first is that, to me, it is a very essential to 
make the difference between international law treaties and foreign domestic 
laws and foreign case law. 
Second, I am the very first one to say that it is good to promote dialo-
gue between judges, dialogue between nations, dialogue between lawyers 
and jurisdictions, and the mutual influence can exist.  We have to face the 
same problems. 
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But, third, if I had any advice to provide to American judges—and I 
have no competence to do that—but, I would say, stop being fascinated by 
the case law of Strasbourg.  Stop— 
(Applause.) 
 
AUDIENCE PARTICIPANT: —I would say stop quoting the case 
law of Strasbourg.  This case law—and I know I can speak freely—that 
case law is completely out of control.  It is made by 45 judges, and, if you 
do that, you will be—especially in a country presiding by the jurisdic-
tions—you will be in the same situation that we are today, which is a coun-
try where we gave up our very precious gift, which are sovereignty and in-
dependence. 
Thank you. 
(Applause.) 
 
DEAN CASS: You can see why François Briard is the President of 
our chapter in France, and the only Frenchman Justice Scalia is willing to 
acknowledge in public. 
 
AUDIENCE PARTICIPANT: Hello, my name is Jonathan Jacobs.  
I’m   in   my   second   year   at   Georgetown   University,   and   I’m   interested   in  
whether anyone on the panel believes The Charming Betsy canon—which 
says that courts should interpret ambiguous statutes not to conflict with in-
ternational law—whether  anyone  believes  that  still   reflects  Congress’s   in-
tent these days. 
 
DEAN CASS: Any   takers   on   that?      I’ve   always   liked   cases   with  
names  like  “the  Charming  Betsy.”    You  just  don’t  get  those  today. 
 
PROFESSOR YOO: I  think  there’s  a  very  good  article  by  Curt  Brad-
ley talking about The Charming Betsy Canon as actually enhancing Con-
gress’s  powers,  because  it  prevents  the  violation of international law unless 
Congress chooses to violate international law.34  And, he tried to read it al-
so  as  a  way  of  protecting  the  President’s  prerogative,  just  to  make  sure  that  
international law is not violated deliberately unless the political branches 
have actually chosen and decided to do it.  And, so, if they do that, you 
want to have something clear from them that they intended to do that. 
 
 
 34 See Curtis A. Bradley, The Charming Betsy Canon and Separation of Powers: Rethinking the 
Interpretive Role of International Law, 86 GEO. L.J. 479 (1998). 
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HON. MR. TAFT: Let me say, I think your question was whether the 
Congress  believes  this.     I  don’t  know  whether  they  believe  it;;  but,  I   think  
they are aware of the doctrine, and they act in knowledge of it, and the doc-
trine has vitality. 
 
PROFESSOR GOLOVE: I think it would probably be hard to an-
swer the  question  posed  in  the  general  way  that  you  did.    There’s  a  lot  of  
international law covering a huge variety of subjects and contexts, and the 
idea that Congress is of one mind about the entire subject of U.S. com-
pliance with international law seems to me   to  be  quite  unlikely.      I’m  not  
expressing   any   expertise   about   what   Congress   thinks   or   doesn’t;;   but,   it  
seems  that,  to  be  pitched  at  that  level  of  generality,  it  can’t  be  right. 
 
DEAN CASS: We have time for two more questions here. 
 
AUDIENCE PARTICIPANT: My name is Frank Marine.  I am a re-
cently retired Department of Justice attorney.  I want to try to cut through 
some of the abstractions, and have a hypothetical question for Mr. Taft and 
Professor  Golove.     Let’s   suppose   that   there’s  a   foreign   flag  vessel on the 
high  seas,  and  on  that  vessel  there’s  Osama  bin  Laden.    The  foreign  country  
adamantly refuses to give the United States consent to board the vessel, the 
Vice  President  advises  the  President  to  go  on  board,  seize  them,  and  we’ll  
worry about the consequences later. 
You two are legal advisers to the President.  What would you advise 
the President? 
 
HON. MR. TAFT: The current president? 
 
AUDIENCE PARTICIPANT: Yes.  Take any president you want. 
 
PROFESSOR GOLOVE: You can speak to this question with great 
expertise.      I’m  only  going   to   say   that   the  panel   today   is—John suggested 
that  I’m  originalist  because  I  was  talking  about  original  history,  but  I  talked  
about original history because that was the subject of the panel, not because 
I’m  originalist.    But  I don’t  think  that  anything  I  said,  given  my  own  me-
thodological perspectives, answers the question that you have by reference 
to the founding. 
But I do think that, if you want my view about it, I think there are 
emergency situations where the President has to have—when the President 
needs to act immediately, the President has to have authority to act imme-
diately, but then he needs to go back and get congressional authorization.  
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It’s  a  change  of  policy. 
 
JUDGE  O’SCANNLAIN: But his boarding would be in violation of 
international law. 
 
HON. MR. TAFT: I  don’t  believe  that  it  would  be.     I   think  that  we  
have  a  right  to  act  against  Osama  bin  Laden  wherever  we  find  him.    We’re  
exercising our right of self-defense.      It’s   endorsed   by   the  Congress.      It’s  
endorsed by the UN Security Council.  And we can go get him. 
 
DEAN CASS: Good answer. 
 
AUDIENCE PARTICIPANT: I wonder—well, the differences be-
tween  our  panelists,  to  what  extent  it’s  affected  by—really, what is meant 
by the Law of Nations?  Will: from your comments, I think I could reach a 
conclusion that the Law of Nations really only means those laws that go-
vern the relations between nations, as opposed to Law of Nations meaning 
what today we use or call public and national law, or international humani-
tarian law, or human  rights  law,  that  great  body  of  law  that’s  generally  re-
ferred  to  as  “international  law.”    Is  it  clear  what  the  Founders had in mind? 
If   that  doesn’t   run  us  out  of   time,   then   I’ll   add  my   second  question,  
which is: What did the Founders mean  by  “declaration  of  war,”  the  power  
to declare war, grant letters of market reprisal, and define rules of captures?  
Did they really mean that as a code word for the ability to use force, or did 
it have a more special meaning? 
 
JUDGE  O’SCANNLAIN: On the first  point,  I  think  the  phrase,  “Law  
of  Nations,”  as  it  was  used  in  the  late  18th  century,  meant  customary  inter-
national   law  as  we  understand   it   today.      I   think   that’s   fairly  well   unders-
tood. 
 
PROFESSOR GOLOVE: The content of customary international 
law at the time was different, but no less broad than it is today.  In fact, in 
some ways, it was broader, because it included principles of conflicts of 
laws; the maritime law—including at that time maritime law insofar as it 
affected inland waters—it affected a whole variety of other subjects which 
were governed by the Law of Nations, the Law of Merchants, and so on.  
So, there were lots of state-to-state issues that were part of the Law of Na-
tions. 
 
PROFESSOR YOO: But, one point that is different, I think, is that 
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there was no concept then that international law would dictate how gov-
ernments   treat   their   citizens   in   terms   of   individual   liberties.      You   don’t  
have the kind of, I think, intrusive level of regulation.  There are a lot of 
treaties now which regulate exactly the same things that we are accustomed 
to thinking about being regulated by domestic governments through sta-
tutes: human rights, environment, energy consumption, and you could go 
on and on. 
I think it is fair to say that what international law was understood to do 
between the 18th century and today has changed; which is why I think 
Judge Bork wanted to read the Alien Torts Statute to only incorporate in-
ternational  law  of  the  18th  century,  because  he  didn’t  believe  Congress  an-
ticipated or thought that this new international law of the 20th and 21st cen-
tury was what the Framers intended when they wrote the Alien Torts 
Statute. 
 
DEAN CASS: My friend François-Henri tells the story of a young 
woman who goes to confession and says to the priest, I can’t  help  admiring  
myself day after day, looking at America, thinking how beautiful I am.  Is 
that  a  sin?    To  which  the  priest  replies:  no,  my  child;;  it’s  not  a  sin,  just  a  
mistake.  I think our panelists demonstrate that we have plenty of room for 
both in our consideration of foreign and international law.  Please join me 
in thanking the panel for their contribution. 
(Panel concluded.) 
